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Abstract 
With the onset of the Information Age, our nation is becoming increasingly dependent 
upon network communications. Electronic commerce becomes more and more 
important in our daily life. A key requirement for electronic commerce is the 
development of secure and efficient electronic payment systems. 
In this thesis, we give an overview of the cryptography techniques for designing 
electronic payment systems. And the issues of security and privacy in off-line 
electronic payment systems are studied by introducing 6 basic requirements of the 
systems, discussing their history and classify system protocols according to their 
efficiency. We also study a simple and efficient single-term e-coin system in details 
In particular, we will present two new results of electronic payment systems. One 
is a transferable e-cash scheme. Transfer the money from person to person without the 
involvement of a bank is a very important property in tradictional cash system, but 
there are only a little researcher talking about the transferability because of its 
difficulty of implementation. Our protocol is the third e-cash system that offers 
transferability. It is much more efficient compare with two old systems which use 
multiple terms. 
The other payment system we presented in the thesis comes in a form as digital 
checks. We proposed two off-line e-check systems in this thesis. One is very simple 
but only supports partial anonymous. The other one is quite complex compare with 
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The topic of this thesis, electronic payment system, is one of the fast-moving areas of 
computer science and mathematics research today. In these systems money is no 
longer represented by an object of trusted value (e.g. paper cash, gold, coins), but by 
information that is worth money. When the payment is effected across a computer 
network, it is called electronic payment. 
We are about to step into a different realm. We'll still buy things in much the same 
way that we buy them today except that Net will just serve as the transaction ether. 
Under this situation, electronic payment systems have applications beyond replacing 
modem paper cash payment system. You can say that everywhere where value is 
assigned to an object by general trust or guarantee, there is the possibility to use 
electronic payment system. 
In this chapter, we begin by quickly reviewing traditional payment forms and 
analyzing their shortcomings, to motivate the subsequent description of today's 
electronic payment system. 
1.1 Traditional Payment Systems 
Traditional payment systems can be divided into two groups: Payments by Cash and 
Payments by Instruction. 
Traditional cash can be used spontaneously and instantaneously, to make 
payments from person to person without the involvement of a bank. Because of 
untraceability, cash payment system also offers privacy. The traditional cash is wide 
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acceptable for low and medium value purchases, which make up the bulk of our 
everyday transactions. 
But traditional cash also has several shortcomings. It is easy to forged by today's 
high technology, notes can be copied using sophisticated color copier machines. Since 
cash comes in fixed denominations, many coins and notes need to change hands to pay 
a single amount. Coins are too heavy to carry around in bulk; both coins and notes are 
easily lost, stolen and destroyed. Because cash can be passed on many times without 
the need for settlement by a bank and without revealing user's identity, it increases the 
difficulty of governmental organizations to trace criminal money such as laundering, 
bribery and extortion. Moreover, since coins and bank notes payments need physical 
proximity of payer and payee, they cannot be used for payments over the phone or the 
Internet. 
Payments by instruction can solve some of the problems of traditional cash 
system. During the payment instead of value itself, the payer transfers to the payee an 
instruction (consider checks and credit cards) directing the payer's bank to transfer a 
specified amount. Credit cards can be used over the phone or the Internet and the 
checks can be mailed by post. Because the actual values movement is done in the bank, 
the risks or theft and lose are largely overcome. 
But payments by instruction also have many shortcomings. First of all, it doesn't 
support privacy, payee need to show his authenticity during the payment and the bank 
or central authority can trace all the payments not only the actual transfer of value but 
also user's identity. Most of instructions, such as credit cards and debit cards need 
on-line processing. An on-line payment can suffer from serious network delays or 
network breakdown. Although check payment system can be verified off-line, but it 
cannot readily issued by the banks and don't allow instantaneous payment. 
1.2 Electronic Payment System 
Any financial transaction involving the electronic transmission of information is 
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called electronic commerce. A particular kind of electronic commerce is that of 
electronic payment. An electronic payment protocol is a series of transactions, at the 
end of which a payment has been made, transmit a packet of digital information issued 
by a third party. 
Compare with traditional payment systems, electronic payment systems have 
higher acceptability and more cost-effective for low-value purchases. It is possible to 
verify payments off-line with cross-platform portability. Moreover, electronic 
payments offer storage and transportation convenience while protecting users against 
loss, theft and accidental destruction. The electronic payment can make through the 
Internet or the phone, since physical proximity of payer and payee should not be 
needed. The electronic payment system also offers privacy and untraceability to its 
user. The account holders can hide transaction details from the bank and the 
confidential payment become possible. In additional to the privacy and untraceability, 
an electronic payment system can accept any special design to discourage criminal 
uses, such as laundering, bribery and extortion. With the right choice of cryptographic 
techniques, many or the entire properties listed above can be achieved. 
As the properties of electronic payment are so attractive, a lot of electronic 
payment systems have been built up around us today. Just in CUHK, you will find you 
are using electronic payment system every day: Photocopy card is used for copying 
papers and notes, PPS is used for bill payment, Electronic token is used for cloth 
washing; Octopus card is used for transportation. Even buying a drink, you can also 
use the electronic payment system (figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Octopus Card Payment System used in drink machine 
1 _3 Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 overviews basic techniques in cryptography in order reader can fully 
understand digital payment systems. 
In chapter 3 we discuss the basic properties of digital payment system in details. 
A basic model of electronic payment system is described and the development history 
of electronic payment system is also introduced. 
Chapter 4 we explain one of the most efficient digital cash system, the Ferguson's 
single-term off-line coins. And in chapter 5，we present a method that bundle different 
denomination into the system and provide an efficient way to store the coins. 
We develop a new e-coin system that adds transferability to Ferguson's 
single-term e-cash. Chapter 5 describes the implementation of the protocol in details 
And in Chapter 6，we present another kind of electronic payment systems — 
e-check system. A simple, efficiency but only support partial privacy e-check system 
is described first. And then comes another e-check system, which includes basic 




In real world, we always need some mechanisms to identify authority parties and users 
involved in a payment-related transaction. The often-used method is the application of 
a human signature to a document that will serve as the legal basis for the transaction. In 
digital world, we require the equivalent mechanisms to proves that someone is going 
to stand behind the value is encoded in the pile of bits. 
The essential elements of these mechanisms can be replicated across computer 
networks through the use of cryptographic techniques. In addition, cryptography is 
useful in protecting against a wide variety of other attacks on the communications 
between two parties. In this chapter we give a basic introduction to the essential 
cryptographic techniques necessary to understand how electronic payment systems 
function. Readers who are already familiar with this material may skip ahead to 
chapter 3 and refer back as required. Details in mathematic can be referred to books 
[Sch96, Sti95] 
2.1 Encryption and Decryption 
Historically, the primary purpose of cryptography has been to keep the message's 
information hidden from adversaries. A process of disguising a human readable form 
message in order to hide its substance is called encryption. The original message is 
referred to in cryptographic terms as plaintext or cleartext, and the resulting message is 
referred to as ciphertext. The reverse process that takes ciphertext as input and restores 
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the original plaintext is called decryption. 
A cryptographic algorithm is a mathematical function used for encryption and 
decryption. All modem encryption algorithms use a key, denoted by EK. Let P denotes 
plaintext and C denotes ciphertext. 
The encryption function E operates on P to produce C: 
Eek{P) = C 
Whereas, the decryption function D operates on C to produce C by using 
decryption key DK: 
DoAC) = P 
Cryptanalysis is a science of recovering the plaintext message without knowledge 
of the key. There are different forms of attacks on a cryptosystem, which are detailed 
described in [Sti95". 
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
In symmetric encryption schemes, the encryption key is the same as the decryption key. 
Therefore, both parties to a communication must first possess a copy of a single secret 
key. Examples of symmetric encryption include the Data Encryption Standard (DES), 
triple DES and the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). 
2.1.2 Asymmetric or Public-Key Encryption 
In Asymmetric Encryption (or Public-Key Encryption), each person gets a pair of 
keys, called the public key and the secret key. The public key is published and widely 
distributed while the secret key is never revealed. The need for exchanging secret keys 
is eliminated as all communications only involve public keys. Examples include RSA 
and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). 
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2.2 RSA 
The standard algorithm for implementing public-key cryptography can be used for 
both encryption and authentication and it is called the RSA algorithm. It was first 
introduced in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adlemant [RSA78] while working at MIT. 
RSA relies upon modulo arithmetic. Its security is based on the difficulty of 
factoring very large numbers. To encode a message using RSA, a user needs a pair of 
keys. 
p,q: two large primes, for maximum security they should be of equal length. 
n: the public key, the product o f p and q. 
e: the public key, a randomly chosen number which is less than n and relatively 
prime to (p-l)(q-l). 
d: the private key, the inverse of {e mod (p-l)(q-l)) such that {ed^l mod 
(p-l)(q-l)r 
Note that, the two large prime factors p and q must be kept secret or destroyed, 
since if anyone could factor n into p and q, the private key e, could be obtained. 
Encryption is simple. A message, M, is first broken into a series of blocks and 
represent each block as an integer mi. The encrypted message, C, will be made up of a 
similarly sized message blocks, c/, of about the same length. The encryption formula is 
c, = m,, mod n 
And the decryption formula is 
m. = c / mod n 
Thus with RSA, each owner of a key pair holds d secret, and issues e and n as her 
public key. The owner does not need to know about p and q, although knowledge of 
these factors may be used to speed up calculations. RSA gains its security from the 
difficulty of factoring large prime numbers. Recovering plaintext M from the 
corresponding ciphertext C, given the public key (e’ n) is equivalent to the problem of 
factoring n, depends on n's length. 
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2.3 Blind Signatures 
Chaum first proposed blind signature in 1982 [Cha83], and constructed first blind 
signature protocol using RSA algorithm [Cha85]. Blind signature method is very 
important for implementing voting and digital cash protocol. The use of blind 
signature is a method for allowing a person to sign a message without being able to see 
its contents. 
We can think the process of blind signature as a notary places a wax seal on the 
outside of an envelope, which contain a piece of paper that the notary doesn't know its 
content. When a blind digital signature is used, cryptography techniques replace the 
envelope and wax seal. The user enciphers the digital document, which is comparable 
to putting the document in an envelope. The notary places a digital signature on the 
encrypted document in the envelope just like a max seal to prove the authenticity of the 
document. 
Mathematically, the blind signature protocol works as follows. Alice wants bank to 
blindly sign a message x. The bank has a public key e, private key d, and a public 
modulus n 二 pq , 
1. Alice chooses a blinding factor r, and sends xr^ (mod n) to the bank. 
2. The bank signs it: (xr'=厂(mod n). 
3. Alice gets the blind signature by dividing out the blinding factor: 
、厂、！ r = xd ( m o d n ) . 
Since r is random, Alice's bank cannot determine x. Therefore, she cannot connect 
the signature with Alice's payment. 
2.4 General Computation Protocols 
In order to limit the affect of adversaries in a crypto system, Yao [Yao82] has given a 
general solution called general computation protocols (also called fault-tolerant 
protocols or secure distributed computation protocols or simply cryptographic 
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protocols). The protocol allows any set of parties to compute any function based on 
their secret inputs, such that every party knows the output of the function but the input 
of each party remains secret. 
Although the protocol can be used to solve some electronic cash system problems, 
such as blind signature, it is extremely slow to implement because its security level 
depend on computational complexity. Therefore, general computation protocol is not 
applicable in practice. 
2.5 Cut-and-Choose Method 
Michael Rabin has used the cut-and-choose protocol for the first time in 1978. The 
reason for choosing the name "cut-and-choose" is its similarity to the classic protocol 
for dividing anything fairly. 
1. Alice cuts the thing in half. 
2. Bob chooses one of the halves for himself. 
3. Alice takes the remaining half. 
Alice has to divide fairly in step (1), because she doesn't know which half will bob 
choose in step (2). 
2.6 Hash Functions 
Hash functions play an important role in electronic cash systems. The hash function 
can compress its output, in such a way that none can efficiently find two inputs that 
compresses to the same string. 
A hash function is a function f with at least following two properties [MOV96 
7. compression —fmaps an input x of arbitrary finite bitlength, to an output 
f(x) of fixed bitlength n. 
2- ease of computation — given f and an input x, f(x) is easy to compute. 
It is generally assumed that the algorithmic specification of a hash function is public 
knowledge. 
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There are some different classes of hash function, here we just overview some of 
them which will be used in our payment systems. 
A one-way hash function (OWHF) is a hash function/ which is easily compute 
f(x), but it is computationally infeasible to 
a. find an input x, give y=f(x), and 
b. find any second input which has the same output as any specified 
input, also given x, find x'^ x such that f ( x ) = f . 
A collision resistant hash function (CRHF) is a hash function f , which is 
computationally infeasible to 
a. find any two distinct inputs x, x，which hash to the same output, 
such thatf(x)=f(x'J. 
b. find any second input which has the same output as any specified 
input, also given x, find x ’半x such that f(x)=f(x') 
2.7 Secret Sharing 
The idea of secret sharing is to start with a secret, and divide it into pieces called shares 
which are distributed amongst users such that the pooled shares of specific subsets of 
users allow reconstruction of the original secret. 
The simplest level of this scheme is to divide the message into n pieces, such that 
any t of them can be used to reconstruct the message. This scheme is called the {t, 
«)-threshold scheme. 
Definition [MOV96]: A (t, n) threshold scheme (tSn) is a method by which a 
trusted party computes secret shares Su 1 ^iSn from an initial secret S, and 
securely distributes Si to user Pi, such that the following is true: any t or more 
users who pool their shares may easily recover S, but any group knowing only t-1 
or fewer shares may not. A perfect threshold scheme is a threshold scheme in 
which knowing only t-1 or fewer shares provide no advantage (no information 
about S whatsoever, in the information-theoretic sense) to an opponent over 
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knowing no pieces. 
There are several other algorithms in secret sharing, please refer to [MOV96] for 
details. 
2.8 Zero-Knowledge Proofs 
The phrase "zero knowledge" in the name means that any eavesdropper will gain zero 
knowledge even if he can overhear the entire conversation. Many people may know it 
as a challenge and response protocol in which one side comes up with a question and 
the other side offers the correct answer. 
Zero-knowledge proofs are very useful in cryptography, particular in electronic 
payment systems. Proofs of identity (a party proves knowledge of his secret key 
without revealing it), knowledge of some information (e.g., the user proves knowledge 
of the coin's inner construction upon payment), or validity of encrypted messages (e.g., 
the use proves that he correctly encrypted his identity in an electronic coin) are 
clarifying examples. 
Let us give a simple zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP) for explanation. The 
protocol is due to Chaum, Evertse, and Graff [CevdG88]: 
1. The values ofA,B andp are public and x is your secret. Alice want to show that she 
know X such that mod p without revealing x. 
2. Bob sends Alice a random challenge b. 
3. Alice sends back a response s = r+ bx mod p-l and h^A'' where r is a random 
number with r <p. 
4. Bob verifies the response by finding that whether P^ mod p equals to /zB^ mod p. If 
it does not, then it is obvious that Alice don't know x. 
In this case, A" mod p can be used as a digital signature oiA if the value of x is kept 
secret. It is considered computationally infeasible to find this x given just A, B, and p. 
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2.9 Timestamps 
Timestamps may be used to provide timeliness and uniqueness guarantees, to detect 
message replay. They may also be used to implement time-limited access privileges, 
and to detect forced delays. 
The basic idea of binding a timestamp to a message is showed as follows. A 
trusted third party T {the timestamp agent) appends a timestamp ti to a submitted 
digital document D, or its hash value f(D), signs the composite document, and returns 
the signed document including tj to the submitter. Subsequent verification of Ts 
signature then is established, based on trust in T, the existence of the document at the 
time ti. The timestamps must be secure to prevent adversarial resetting of a clock 
backwards so as to restore the validity of old messages, or setting a clock forward to 
prepare a message for some future point in time. 
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Overview of Electronic Payment 
Systems 
In this chapter we try to give a clear understanding of electronic payment system, as 
well as many concepts applicable to electronic payment systems in general, by 
showing their basic requirements, classifying them according to their efficient and 
introducing their history. 
3.1 Life Cycle 
In normal paper cash systems, there are three related parties: bank, user and shop. We 
will also use these terms for parties in electronic payment systems in this thesis. 
We make a distinction between two kinds of electronic payment system: 
transferable, and non-transferable. Non-transferable electronic payment system is 
electronic money that has to be deposited with the bank, whenever it has been spent 
once. This is shown in the model of Figure 3.1. Transferable money can be withdrawn 
from the bank, then paid from user to user, and finally deposited by either a shop or a 
user. A transaction model for such a system is shown in Figure 3.2. Both systems use 
the same kind of transactions. Money is first withdrawn from the bank, then it is paid 
(either once or several times), and finally, it is deposited with the bank, which 
concludes the money's life cycle. The core of a cryptographic design of an electronic 
cash system then consists of the protocols for withdrawal, payment and deposit. 
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Depending on the functionality of the cash system, other cryptographic protocol may 
be need. 
A remark one might make is that there is only one bank. Of course in some 
real-life situations there would be several banks. The more advanced electronic 
payment systems usually work fine with multiple banks. Just as with paper cash, there 
is a “Federal Bank" which “prints,，all the money, and each bank does the verification 
of money for itself. 
BANK 
iC (2) Payment  
PAYER L ^ SHOP 
Figure 3.1: Life cycle of an non-transferable electronic payment system 
BANK 
(1) Withdrawal (3) Deposit 
^ (2) Payment \ 
USERl J USER 2 . �U S E R N ~ ~ 
^ ^ • • • • • I ^ Figure 3.2: Life cycle of a transferable electronic payment system 
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3.2 Six Basic Requirements 
Digital money is designed to construct an electronic payment system that modeled our 
daily paper cash payment system. Therefore digital money should fulfill all the 
requirements of paper cash. In 1991, two cryptographers Tatsuaki Okamoto and Kazua 
Ohta [0092] formulated six requirements of the ideal electronic payment system. 
Here we present in detail six basic requirements of digital money: 
Independence (認錢不認人時地） 
The security and use of digital money do not depend on any physical location, time 
and the user. The money can be transferred through computer networks into storage 
devices and vice versa. 
Security (防僞） 
Digital money cannot be counterfeited and double-spend. That is no one can create 
money without the intervention of the bank, or spend the same money more than once 
at different places. 
Privacy (神不知鬼不覺） 
The payment system should have protection against eavesdropping and the payer 
should be anonymous during the payment. The bank and the shop cannot trace the 
relationship between a person and a purchase. 
Off-line Payment (兩造搞定） 
Payment protocols can be implemented in either of two ways off-line or on-line. 
Tatsuaki Okamoto and Kazua Ohta believe that an ideal payment system should be 
working off-line. During a transaction, the only parties involved are the payer and the 
payee. No customer-bank or merchant-bank on-line connection is required. 
Transferability (即時聿專張） 
Transferability allows a user to spend money that he has received in a payment 
immediately without having to contact the bank. A payment is transferable if the 
payee can use the received money in other payment. 
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Divisibility (永遠有零錢） 
Electronic money should have the ability to make "change" (some people like 
Okamoto believe that even the paper cash is undividable [0092]). A quantity of digital 
money must be divisible into smaller amounts, and they must total up again when 
recombined. So users can always make an exact payment. 
Implementing an electronic payment system that can fulfill all six requirements 
has a number of technical challenges. System designers always find a tradeoff between 
system complexity and features. Only a few of cryptographers have designed a system 
that meets all six requirements theoretically, but they have not been practice to date. 
3.3 Efficiency 
To implement a practical electronic payment system, efficiency is a very important 
issue. However, there may be many ways to determine whether an electronic payment 
system is “efficient，’ or not, since there is a great variance of efficiency requirements 
among different applications. Thus, instead of attempting to formally defined 
efficiency, we treat electronic payment system into 3 groups based on blind signature 
designs (following by Franklin and Yung [FY93]). Each group represents different 
efficiency level. These groups are informally described below: 
E-cash based on general computation protocols 
General computation protocols (described in section 2.4) can be used to implement 
blind signatures. User contributing one input (message to be signed), the bank 
contributing the other input (secret signature key), and the user alone receiving the 
output (signed message). Although general computation protocols are very powerful 
in that they allow arbitrary computation, they are extremely slow to implement. It is 
unreasonable for a coin scheme to have a communication cost that depends on the 
computational complexity of the underlying signature function algorithm. Will the 
bank mint a one-cent coin weigh fifty kilograms? A scheme of blind signature base on 
general computation protocols is secure, but definitely not efficient. 
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Cut-and-choose systems 
Some e-cash systems have employed a cut-and-choose technique: A user presents 2n 
(where n is the security parameter) messages to the bank when he wants withdraw the 
money, the bank verify the correctness of n messages and blind signs the remaining 
messages. The cut-and-choose technique is a tool for a zero-knowledge proof of 
correctness of the coin, thus preserving user anonymity (see section 2.8 for a definition 
of zero-knowledge proof). 
A very serious shortcoming of this straightforward implementation is that the 
probability of detecting a fraud increases only linearly in the number of message given, 
and thus a huge amount of data must be exchanged in order to achieve a sufficiently 
low probability of successful deception, i.e. the n is very large. Since the scheme's 
communication, computation and storage requirements are multiplied by a factor of n, 
the realization of cut-and-choose is still far from practical. 
Single-term systems 
"Single-term" means that there is only one “term，，is used per coin. Generally it 
denotes all non cut-and-choose schemes those use n terms in transaction. In contrast to 
cut-and-choose based e-cash, recently proposed single-term systems employ efficient 
zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols providing the same functionality as cut-and-choose 
systems with a reduction by a factor of n in storage, computation and communication. 
It avoids the expensive cut-and-choose method, by user blinding a secret key into 
coin or check; and the bank encodes user's identifier into the coin or check as the 
blinding-invariant part of the secret key. The invention of single-term systems makes 
the realization of an efficient off-line electronic payment system become possible. 
This thesis focuses on single-term systems whose efficiency allows immediate 
practical application. 
3.4 History 
Although electronic payment systems become more and more important in our daily 
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life, public literature on the design of electronic payment systems is scarce and 
dispersed. There are several books have been published about electronic commerce, 
but these are all non-technical and focus on credit-card systems. In this section, we 
introduce the history of papers that are on cryptographic design of electronic payment 
systems, the main source for articles are come from the annual EUROCRYPT and 
CRYPTO conferences. 
Early schemes for electronic payment systems used general computation 
protocols; including Damgard's on-line payment system [Dam90], Pfitzmnn and 
Waidner's off-line payment system [PW92]. Since most systems are so complex that 
they are notoriously slow to implement. But after the invention of blind signature 
techniques (definition in section 2.3) by Chaum, the real application of untraceable 
off-line electronic payment systems became possible. People studied the subject of 
electronic payment system and proposed various schemes. Most of them (e.g. Chaum, 
Fiat and Naor [CFN90], Okamoto and Ohta [0090], Chan, Frankel and Tsiounis 
CFT95, CFT96, CFT96]) used multiple challenges terms and "cut-and-choose" 
techniques in cash withdrawal as well as in payment phases in order to thwart cheating. 
Such kind of schemes are very inefficient since the communication, computation and 
storage requirements are multiplied by a factor n. Fianklin and Yung ([FY92], [FY93]) 
gave another construction for a provably secure coin scheme using a secret sharing 
line instead of multiple challenge terms (their schemes still used cut-and-choose in 
withdrawal phase). In 1993, three efficient "single-term" papers (Brand [Bra93], 
Cramer and Pedersen [CraPe93], Ferguson [Fer93]) have been proposed respectively, 
instead of cut-and-choose method, they used a direct construction. 
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Chapter 4 
Ferguson's Single-term Off-Line 
Coins 
In this chapter, we explain a single-term off-line coins system developed by Niels 
Ferguson [Fer93] in details. He presented a new construction for off-line electronic 
coins that is both far more efficient and much simpler than previous systems. The 
system only used a single term in random challenge and response method. And does 
not use a cut-and-choose methodology in withdrawal protocol, but used a direct 
construction. 
We introduce base assumption and tools used by Ferguson's system first in 
section 4.1. And then explain the whole system in details in section 4.2. 
4.1 Basic Assumption and Tools 
4.1.1 Secure Hash Function 
One-way and collision resistant hash functions are very useful in electronic payment 
system. They have many applications; one of them is the most important for system in 
this paper. If a protocol uses a number y somewhere, and if the protocol can be 
attacked with v chosen to have some special form, then j, can be taken y=f(x). This 
disables any user to come up with specially formed y. Later, we will show how the 
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hash function is applied in our payment systems. 
Currently in whole paper, we are using Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) (detail 
algorithms please refer to [MOV96]) as our cryptographic hash function for the 
electronic payment system, since it is both one-way and collision-intractable. 
4.1-2 Polynomial Secret Sharing Scheme 
The most difficult fraud to counter in electronic cash system is double-spending, i.e. 
user can spend same cash twice. For off-line payment system, we cannot detect this 
fraud immediately during the payment. The solution is we identify the double-spender 
after the fact. At each payment the user is required to release information in response 
to a challenge from the shop. One such release provides no clue to the user's identity, 
but two such releases are sufficient to identify the user uniquely. Employing Secret 
Sharing scheme (refer to section 2.7 for details) in challenge and response protocol can 




r — kx + U 
r 
• 
Save X, r 
Figure 4.1: Shamir's Polynomial Secret Sharing Scheme 
In protocol, Shamir's polynomial secret sharing scheme [Sha79] is used for 
double-spending detection. The scheme is based on polynomial interpolation, and the 
fact that a univariate polynomial y = / ( x ) of degree M is uniquely defined by t points 
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{xi, yl) with distinct Xi (since these define t linearly independent equations in t 
unknowns). To detect double-spending, we need to identify the user if we get two pairs 
of challenge and response, hence the polynomial secret sharing scheme can apply in 
the protocol (fingure 4.1). 
Alice has her identity U and a secret number k. 
1. Bob random generates a challenge x and send it to Alice 
2. Alice response r=kx+Uto Bob. 
3. Bob save x and r for later detection. 
From above scheme, once challenge and response process will not show Alice's 
identity, but two such will identify Alice by solving two equations with two variables 
providing that two challenges are different. Later we will show how to use Blank 
Signature to prevents Alice from changing the values of k and U and use one way hash 
function to prevents Bob from generate two same challenges. 
4.1.3 Randomized Blind Signature 
In order to keep user's privacy in all transactions, we should use blind signature (see 
section 2.3) to prevent bank or shop has the ability to trace user's identity. In protocol, 
we use a blind signature call randomize blind signature that was proposed by Chaum 
in 1992 [Cha92]. The bank publics a key pair (v’ n), a one-way function f , and a 
random number ge^ Z*. 
Step 1 The user chooses a random number a^ e Z: , and two blinding 
factors CTG^  Z* and /g^ Z ,^ . She computers y^a^g"" and send it to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank chooses its own contribution a j and sends it back to User. 
Step 3 The user computes • a) ) - a , and sends the result to bank. 
Step 4 The bank multiplies 广a^g"" by a � and to get The 
bank computes the v'th root of this number and sends it to User. 
/ \ 
Step 5 The user divides out the blinding factor/ to get the pair [a, The 
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number a = a^a^ is called the base number of the signature. 
User Bank 
• 
n a 卢 rK "2 
< 
/ ( a 丨-a^ya • 
< 
a a^a2 
s ^ i j y - 1 r 
9 
Figure 4.2: Randomized Blind Signature 
This signature satisfies all the requirements of the proposed protocol. 
1. User cannot create signature herself: It is computationally infeasible to 
forge a signature pair of the form 厂(“）)i�. Suppose the user wants to 
forge a signature pair (<:/. A), she should solve the equation A�. = The 
first way is fix A and try different values of a until you get lucky. The 
probability of success is very small equal to 1/v. The second way is to choose 
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ag 八and compute out the values of A. This method need find the v'th root, 
which is as difficult as breaking RSA-key algorithm. No general methods are 
currently known that attempt to break RSA in this way. 
If User has a large number of valid signature pairs, can she find a new 
one from exiting signatures? The answer is no because of one-way hash 
function f . User is difficult to get any valid signature by any combination of 
exiting signatures. 
2. The number of signature was randomly chosen: The base number of 
signature a is the result of • a:�, where aj is contribution given by the 
user and a � is contribution given by the bank. This method use two random 
numbers make sure that the message sign by bank is randomly chosen. 
3. The bank receives no information regarding which signature User gets: 
In the protocol, there are two blinding factors y and cr that was randomly 
generated by the user. If the bank want to know what signature pair the user 
gets, she should find the value of a or ag八“、.Let's check all the 
communication to and from the bank, plus all the random choices that the 
bank made. He only gets the value of a2, f(a) and aj are all hidden by two 
blinding factors. From the bank's point of view, all possible signature pairs 
are equally likely. 
4.2 The Basic Signal-term Cash System 
This system uses secret sharing techniques. The blind signature used here is called a 
randomized blind RSA-based signature. In this case the bank still doesn't know what 
is signing, but she knows that the data wasn't chosen maliciously. 
This system needs 3 numbers, C, A, and B. These will be of the form 
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C e c g f � 
A — ag,，、 
B — b g f , � 
And two RSA-signatures from the bank: 
灼 izv 
Where the numbers g � g a and gb are publicly known and of the large order in 
group Z*. The number he and hb are elements of order n and/ is a one-way function. U 
is the user's identity, v is the bank's public key. 
4-2.1 The Withdrawal Protocol 
The withdrawal protocol consists of three parallel runs of the randomized blind 
signature scheme. Two of the runs are the restricted version, and one is the unrestricted 
version. 
Step 1 The user chooses randomly a；, cj, bj (her contributions to the base numbers) 
and y (the blinding factors). The user computes 
, a^a^g''^, P^b^gl and sends them to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank then chooses her three contributions to the base numbers q, 办2. 
And sends /z，，/z，and a � to the user. Sending a � directly allows the user to 
raise one of the resulting signatures to a power she chooses. 
Step 3 The user chooses a random tj and computes 
a <r- (3 J 2 . (e^, e ^ , where is an one - way function. 
�—f/(。)-厂• 广1 
The user sends e^, e^  and e^  to the bank. 
Step 4 The bank compute the blinded version oiA, B and C. 
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b <r- b^bj 
C —eg，） 
A — agf，、 
B — bgl^h� 




Figure 4.3: The withdrawal protocol of Ferguson's Single term e-cash 
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C — . C2 • ,forc = 
A ^ a'a.g： . a, . (e^, =仅乂以容！】,々 ),(《) 
The following relations hold between the blinded numbers and their 
unblended values: 
The bank then chooses a random t2 and sends 
. I ) " ' , and(P ,互广 to the user. 
Step 5 The user now constructs the numbers 
User computes two signatures 
凡 — ( ( e 、： ^广 /广仅 (严 .互广 
The user checks the signatures she received are correct by verifying that 
：^ =CA and S； = C"万 where t = V2. 
User ends up with the following numbers: c, a, b, (the base numbers) t, (the 
random parameter for the secret sharing line), Sa and Sb (the signatures). These 6 
numbers plus the identity U are used as input to the payment protocol. 
4.2.2 The Payment Protocol 
Instead of using many challenge terms for double-spending detection, the protocol 
uses a polynomial secret sharing scheme [detail please refer to section 4.1.2]. The 
protocol (Figure 4.4) is described as below: 
Step 1 The user sends a, b, and c to Shop. 
Step 2 The shop replies with a randomly chosen challenge x. 
Step 3 The user responses with r=kx+U and the signature (c' A^'b)'" to the shop. 
Step 4 The shop verifies the consistency of these two responses and then he accepts 
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the payment. 
User Shop  
c. a. h ^ 
X < 
r 二 tx + U 
co={s,y{s,) 
r. Co ^ 
A — 
B — bgi�'b� 
{Co)'=C'A'B 
Figure 4.4: The payment protocol of Ferguson's single-term e-cash 
4.2.3 The Deposit Protocol 
At the end of the day, the shop will deposit the money to her account. 
Step 1 The shop sends c, a, b, the challenge x, the responses r and the signature Co 
to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank verifies the correctness of the coin and credits the shop with 
corresponding amount. 
If the user spends the same coin twice, she must reveal two different points on the 
line r — tx + U which immediately allows the bank to determine her identity U. 
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Cash with Different 
Denominations 
In this section, we review a method of denomination bundling by [Cha90] and present 
an extension by observing an equivalent related to RSA number system. 
5.1 Denomination Bundling 
Now let's look at how we can bundle denomination terms into an e-coin. Instead of 
single key, the bank publics a list of keys presented different denomination of the coins. 
Let k denotes the number of different denominations, and {fl\,d”...dk) denote a list 
of denominations. Let (v力，,...,v(�)denote a list of valid RSA exponents for 
corresponding denomination, they are pairwise co-prime numbers. See Table 4.1 as 
example, in which each v^  is a prime number. The distribution of the coin 
denominations is chosen in such a way that it is guaranteed that no matter how the 
money is spent 一 at least a certain amount of money can be made in payment. 
i ^ ^ ^ 4 5 6 7 8 9 
di $0.01 $0.02 $0.05 $0.10 $0.20 $0.50 $1.00 $2.00 $5.00 
5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 
Table 5.1. A list of public keys present for different denomination 
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The withdraw protocol of the single-term e-coin system will not change except 
that the bank uses corresponding private-key to sign the coins depend on its 
denomination. The protocol can be executed in parallel as many times as required to 
withdraw the desired amount. In previous protocol, all random numbers of exponent 
are generated from group Zv in order to make power method simpler but decrease the 
security level of the protocol. In our new protocol, apart from the random secret 
number a!’ aj, bi, b】，cj, cj are members of the set Z*, the user also picks the random 
binding factors cr’ r,中,y, a, (3 in the same set to make sure that no one can find the 
random numbers with high probability of success. 
First, there is the fact that we use not just one, but a number of public exponents 
with the same RSA modulus to encode the difference denominations within a coinage. 
This raises the question whether, for instance, the user finds a special way to construct 
coins with valid format and denomination those are not deviating from the prescribed 
protocol. Recall that even if the user has a large number of valid signature pairs, it is 
still difficult for her to find new ones (details please refer to section 4.4.3). But can the 
user construct a coin of higher denomination from coin of lower denomination? More 
formally, the question is whether for some a, b, c e Z\ and two co-prime number 
G Z* {wherev.^^ > v.), it is feasible to compute say, ( C … � � , 广 f r o m 
the values S^ 二 ( C ' v l 广 ' = 万广'.We can show that this question is answered 
in the negative. It is equal to compute {S^Y'^ "'^ ' and (iS。）"^""^'、'，the computation is just 
as difficult as finding RSA roots if V] is not divisible by F/+/. 
5.2 Coin Storage 
By using the way described previously to bundle the denomination into e-coin, it 
comes the other advantage that coin can be stored in a very small space. In this system 
great efficiency is derived from the fact that in the RSA crypto system signatures with 
different exponent can be combine together by multiplication and later separated. 
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Throughout the paper, all the arithmetic is performed in a RSA groups Zn with n is 
the product of two (or more) distinct primes p and q. We find that given two distinct 
numbers x and y, and given two roots a and b which are relative prime. Then if we 
know a number s, which is equal to .广,we can easily find “ and 
separately. 
The way to separate two roots is show as below: 
Because (a, b)=l, there is a number b,0 <b < a with 
bb mod a 
t = \bb la_ 
We can compute two numbers 
{sf 
d^s/x"" 
where c = “ and d ^ y ' " " 
How can this way apply to more than two terms? Suppose you want to separate 
l/fl. l/fl, 1 /fl/. /A 1 X 
. . … ( 4 . 1 ) 




Compute A! aj Al cik  ^k 
And rewrite equation (4.1) 
Ma, ( Alaj AI a. ^ ^ •1-^ 2 . . … I 
We can apply the way described previously to separate ;c广丨.Repeat this until all 
terms are separated. 
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For coins storage, we can just multiply the coins with different denomination 
together and easily recover the original signature by using the method described above. 
In original e-cash system (described in chapter 4) each coin need be store in about 250 
bytes [Fer93]. With bundling different denomination into e-coin, the minimum coin 
size can be reduced to about 30 bytes. We can save several coins of the form 
k k 
{LA,LB,LC,S\,S2} where , — 万 ， 
/=1 i=\ 
LA = II II... II , LB = b�II II... II 办"，LC = c^ || Cj | | . . . || . Please note that 
the exponents of each coin should be different. 
With today's hard drives and memory chips there is absolutely no problem of 
storing any sensible number of coins. 
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An Off-Line Transferable E-coin 
System 
6.1 Introduction 
Six criteria of an ideal cash system described by Tatsuaki Okamoto and Kazua Ohta 
are (1) independence, (2) security, (3) privacy, (4) off-line payment, (5) divisibility and 
(6) transferability. Cash protocols described in early papers have solved the first five 
characteristics. The last characteristic is the most interesting one considered in this 
chapter. 
Transferability of electronic cash means that the payee in one payment 
transaction can spend the received money in a later payment to a third person without 
contacting the bank or another central authority between the two transactions. This 
property is only the issue for the off-line payment systems, since in on-line system, 
payee need communication with bank or a central authority to prevent 
double-spending during the payment transaction. 
The ability to transfer the money on modem payment system is a basic 
requirement. Will you go to bank every time after you receive a value of money? It will 
not happen in our real life since we can transfer the paper cash to others freely. In 
non-transferable electronic cash system, deposit procedure after every transaction will 
extremely increase bank's workload and network traffic as more than billions of 
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payments are made around the world each day. 
Although the ability to transfer paper money is very important in our daily life, 
there are only a few number of papers paid attention to this property. Until now, there 
are only two off-line electronic payment systems claimed that they could support 
transferability. 
Okamoto and Ohta ([0090] and [0092]) proposed the first transferable payment 
system, which is also the first system that supports all 6 basic requirements. The 
scheme is extremely inefficient, since it used "cut-and-choose" techniques in cash 
withdrawal and multiple terms for challenge and response method in payment. After 
each transfer, both computational power and the size of cash will increase a lot. The 
protocol is so complex and difficult to understand (the concise description of the 
protocol in [0090] requires 13 pages) that it is difficult to implement in the real world. 
In [VA90], the writer presented the other transferable payment system that can 
pay a variable amount of money with a single check. The system protocol didn't use 
cut-and-choose protocol in withdrawal, but used a direct construction. However, it still 
use multiple terms in its payment protocol. Each user need to check n more signatures 
(where n is the number of terms), after each transfer, the computational power linearly 
increase by a factor n. 
In this chapter, we present a new transferable off-line e-cash system motivated by 
Ferguson's withdrawal protocol. As the knowledge of the authors, the payment system 
is the third transferable e-cash system that has been proposed. The new construction is 
both far more efficient and much simpler than previous systems. It use single-term 
challenge and respond method instead of multiple terms, and use a direct method in 
withdrawal instead of cut-and-choose methodology. The computational power and 
storage space is so small that even the smart card can handle the transaction. 
Except for transferability, we also show a simple mechanism that combine coins 
together to produces a new coin have a value, which is the sum of the values of all 
combined coins. 
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6.2 The Withdrawal Protocol 
The basic concept to realize transferability is the idea of coin with no denomination, i.e. 
coin with no values. We have introduced a way to bundle denomination into e-coin in 
chapter 5, it is easy to identify a coin with no values, just assign one more public 
exponent present zero denomination. Table 6.1 is a modified denomination 
distribution table compare with table 5.1. Of course, users can obtained these kinds of 
zero value coins from the bank freely. 
i ^ ^ ” ” 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
~~di~~~$0.00 $0.01 $0.02 $0.05 $0.10 $0.20 $0.50 $1.00 $2.00 $5.00 
3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 
Table 6.1. A list of public keys present for different denomination 
The withdrawal protocol is the same as Ferguson's withdrawal protocol as it 
meets all requirements of our system. Readers who are already familiar with 
Ferguson's withdrawal protocol may skip ahead to the payment protocol and refer 
back as required. 
Before the execution of withdrawal protocol (Figure 6.1), there is an agreement 
of money amount between the bank and the user. Let's denote the amount of money is 
d and the corresponding public key is v. 
Step 1 The user chooses 9 random numbers a!, c“ bi, G,r水；rand sends 
Step 2 The bank then chooses 3 random numbers C2, a2, b? and sends h^', hi' and a: 
to the user. 
Step 3 The user chooses a random number ti to compute 
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“ ― ( “ I “ 2 . / 2 K . , � )Y ' 
• 
C <- C,C2 
b bfi: 
t 
A — “ g ( ( � 
if— —M/V V, � 7 — (卜 I , - a ] 
S:=CA 
Figure 6.1: The withdrawal protocol of off-line transferable e-coin system 
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<3 (以1 . /2 {e^, eb)),丨，where is an one - way function. 
� / ( � ) - , . h 
The user sends e^, e^  and e^  to the bank. 
Step 4 The bank computes three values C, A, B and sends them to the use, where 
c <r~ r '^lgc • • Sc , for C = C1C2 
B^ fi'b.gt'b,for b = b,b, 
A — a � g : - a , - / , ) g：" = 
The bank sends 丄’ 
to User, where t2 is a random number. 
Step 5 The user finds three numbers C <- cgf � ,A <- agf ("), B — 
And constructs two signatures 
凡 — 广 / 广 仅 ( p . 互 广 
She can verify the signatures by 
9 9 ；^ =CA and S； =CUB where t = . 
After withdrawal, User will obtain a coin with a value d. It include three base 
numbers {a, b, c) and two bank's signatures (CBf\ 
6.3 The Transfer I Payment Protocol 
Before the payment actually takes place. Payer and payee have to come to an 
agreement on what the object is going to be purchased and for which amount d. 
A simplified payment protocol between Userk and Userk+i runs in figure 6.2. 
After the payment, a new coin with no values, which belongs to Userk, will append to 
the transferred coin. That means Userk's identity will be embedded into the coin. 
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Step 1 Userk send Coink-i _ ” L C “ , L R k _ \ , d � t o Userk+i where 
M - l =以丨 II 以2 II 
丨=h, II ...II 办， 
丄 = Cj II c^  II... II 
LRk-\ =厂1丨丨厂2丨丨..II 
Where (at, bi, Cj) is the base numbers of the coin that embedded by Userj in 
previous payments. 
? 
Userk+i should verify the coink+i by using function valid{Coin,^_^). The 




办,+1 seperate LB丨 
seperate LC• 
广1,,..., r, seperate LR丨 
Xj, ,. .., X. Xj <— {pj+\ , ^ 7+1 , ^ j+\ ) 
4 ' ' • • •'4+1 Aj 一 ajg f: j� 
/.KO 
辟,爲找+ 1 Bj—bjgb�) 
c c C C ^ c fr.((��") 
Co— C o , — — 寧 1 
Co 丨― Co,—— n(c7 仏 ） 
7=2 
Output  
Where fs is an one-way and collision resistant hash function, v為 and v^ 
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are public exponents associate with zero amount and d amount repectively. 
Please note that, for first payment, Useri pays Co in� t o User�，where Coo=l, 
LAo=a!，LBo=b j’LCo=cI，LRo=0 and d is the denomination of coin that User] 
pays to User2. 
Step 2 Userk+i sends a challenge Xk to Userk where e ( a众 + � , , <：々 +,) 
In this step, the challge x" is an output of an one-way hash function/instead 
of a random generated number. The method has two purposes 
1. Ensure Userk always get different challenges if she tries to spend a coin 
more than once. 
2. Ensure Userk+i only can use one secret value in chalenge and response 
method of later payment. 
Step 3 Userk computes the response r^  <— t/^ Xj^  + U/^  , a zero value coin 
Co[ <—�Sak SM , and sends them to Userk+i. 
Step 4 Userk+i verifies the response by finding wether (Co二 广。equal to C:' A:' Bj^, 
if it is not equal, Userk+i terminates the protocol. 
Until now, Userk+i can produce a valid new coin Coirik with amount d. She 
does following job: 
丄A 二 LAh II 
LB, = I I / ) � 
LCk - ^ Q - i II 
LR, = II r, 
CCk — • Co[ 
Userk+i obtains Coirik with form {Co ,^LA,^ ,LB,^  .LC"LR,^ ,cf\. 
If we want to pay several coins to match a total amout D, we can run payment 
protocols parellelly to save the processing time. 
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Userk Userk+i 








^^k - II 
LB, = II b“� 
LCk = ZC"一丨 II 
LRk = II r, 
COk — c v丨 - Co； 
Coin,, 
Figure 6.2: The Payment Protocol between Userk and Useri<+i 
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6.4 The Deposit Protocol 
After k times of transfer, userk want to deposit the coin into the bank, she first connects 
to the bank and sends the coitvi. The bank checks wether the coin is valid by using the 
7 
function valid(Coin,^_^) (function details please refer to section 6.3). If the coin is 
valid, the bank deposits the money of amount d into Usei^s account. In the deposit 
protocol (figure 6.3), we don't need to keep user anonymous, as Userk should present 
his account number to the bank. In order to offer unconditional privacy, Userk cannot 
use coinic, which was used to generate challenge Xk-i for last payment, any more. 
Otherwise, the bank can link the payment to Userk's account as the coin generates 
same challenge. 
Userk Bank 





deposit to user's account 
check for double - spending 
save coin to checklist 
Figure 6.3: The Deposit protocol for between user and bank 
The most important part in deposit protocol is how to find the double-spender. 
Consider the tree of payments constructed in Figure 6.4. Useri withdraws a Coino from 
the bank and pays this coin to User�. During this transaction Coino is changed to Coini. 
Later User� pays this coin to Users, and after this transaction coin has been changed to 
Coini- Users double spend the money and pays the coin to User4 and User4’，after 
transactions, coin became Coins and Coins'. User* and User4’ continue pays the coin to 
other users and so on. Later, Users,, User?” and User6 deposit the coins Coins', Coin6，， 
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and Coins. From the payment tree, you can see that both Users and Users double-spend 
the money. By using the transfer protocol described previously, we can find that the 
bank only can find the identities of double-spender and other users' identity is 
unknown. 
^ i n o 
( ^ s e r i ) 
^ ~ C ^ i n i 
( U s e r 2 ^ 
( ^ e r s j V-~^Coins 
C o i n ^ 
( u ^ c � i n 5 j > ~ ^ ^ 5 
； T @ ( S ) 
Coirifi" / 
Figure 6.4: Payment tree with double-spending 
The bank will get a list of coin's base numbers {a, b, c), challenges x and 
responses r from each coin. 
From Coins', the bank gets: 
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( 以 1 , , , , X j ), ( ^ 2 , 办 2 ' ( 2 '厂 2 ' ) , ( “ 3 , 办 3 , 。 3 ,厂 3 , )， (以 4 , 办 4 ‘ 。 4 ， 厂 4 ‘ ), ( ^ 5 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ )' 
From Coin(3，，, the bank gets: 
( 以 1 , 5 CJ , TJ , X| ), {A2 ,办2 ' ( 2 '厂2 ' ), (“3 ,办3 ‘ � 3 ‘厂3 ‘ )' (^4 ？ ‘ ‘ ‘ )'(以5 ,办5 , � 5 ,厂5 , ), 
From Coins, the bank gets: 
Bank will search each coin base numbers in the checklist, if coin's owner has 
double-spent the coin, the same coin base number will have a pair of different 
challenge and response, in this case, they are coin with base number (aj, bs, cj) and (aj, 
bs, cs). The identity of users can be found easily from challenge and response pairs 
using Polynomial Secret Sharing Scheme (detail please refer to section 4.1.2). 
After checking for double-spender, the bank saves the coin list to its checklist for 
later comparison of the double-spender checking. 
6.5 Expansion of Coins 
Until now, we are talk about transfer the coin with fixed value. In each transaction, 
every user adds a coin with no value into original coin. In this chapter, we will 
introduce a new concept that user can expand the denomination of coin during the 
transaction. The mechanism we are talking about here is really a very simple trick: 
Instead of adding a coin with no value, user can add a coin with desired value. We just 
need to make a little change on the original protocol. The form of Coink will become 
{Co,, LA,, LB, 
,LCk ,LRk ,LDk�where ZZ)^  | |... || d,^ ( d. is the 
denomination of each attached Coiiii). As our denomination distribution table in 
chapter 6.3, there are only 10 different denominations. The size of LDk will be very 
small compare with RSA signature, hence the size of whole coin will not change a lot. 
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？ 
Also the verify function valid{Com^) (detail please refer to chapter 6.4) will 
change a little too. 
Input: ； ： Coin丨:{Co,, LA., LB., LC丨,LR., LD.} 
Temporary: ~~ a , , ^ 2 , . . . , s e p e r a t e LA丨 
, ,...,办,+1 seperate LB. 
Cj, (：2,..., seperate LC, 
厂1,厂2,...,厂, seperate LR, 
A A /\ 
d\,d2,...d丨 seperate LD-
Xi,X2,...,X, XJ <— ,b川,c川) 
, 乂2,..., 4+1 Aj I ajgf}�) 
… , B 丨 B 广 b j g : � 
c c C C ^ r fr 
i 
Co乂、广..Co'd�) Co; — f ] C O t e . 
7=1 
i • �C o _ p j 一 if dj ="") 
COte.丨=1 J 
Output 9 9 9 I ^ 
_ � = n K l r 
7=0 
Compared with fixed value coin transaction, transfer coin with expansion need 
more exponentiation computation. The deposit protocol between the user and the bank 
will remain unchanged. 
6.6 Security and privacy Analysis 
In this section we analyze the issues on the security and privacy of the payment 
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system. 
Privacy 
The privacy of payment may be the decisive factor in ultimate acceptance of electronic 
payment system in an open market. In the transferable e-coin system protocol 
proposed, we offer unconditional privacy. The payment is confidential, the 
wire-tapper cannot get any details of transaction, and even the bank cannot get any 
information such as purchase descriptions. The payment have untraceability, every 
electronic cash payment doesn't cause a unique transaction identifier to end up in the 
computer files of the bank. 
In particular, privacy is extremely difficult in implementation of a transferable 
e-cash system, because cash embed a list of users' identity, in order to offer the privacy, 
system should only allow the double-spenders can be identified and other users' 
identity are hidden from the bank. Our payment system satisfies this condition, it 
achieves the property of privacy. 
Change of Coin Content: 
A possible attack is double-spender will modify the coin content such that bank cannot 
find her identity. Let's consider Coink with the form {Co^,LA^ LD,^,LR^} 
(we assume here user can expand coin during transfer, if the user cannot crack such 
coin, it is obviously that she cannot crack the coin which transferred in fixed value). 
Can user make a new Coink' without adding any new coin and have the form 
9 {Co[, LA[, LB[ LD[, LR[}, which can pass the verify function valid (Coin )? 
Cok is a multiplication of a list of valid Randomized Blind Signature, As the property 
of the Signature, the only way the user can change the value of Cok is multiply it with a 
valid coin. By doing this, user's identity will be embedded into the coin. Hence the 
user cannot generate a new Co[ without involve his identity. How about change the 
values of LA[,LB[,LC[ ？ Ferguson's paper [Fer93] shows that the difficulty of 
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changing value of a, b, c is same as forge a randomized blind signature. LD[ is the 
public key of the bank for different denomination is co-prime to each other. Forging 
LD[ is stated to be equivalent in computational difficulty to factoring. Now, let's think 
about LR[/\t represents the response assume came from user's secret value and her ID. 
If the user can change the value ofLR[, the bank cannot find it's identity even user 
double spend the coin. Let's look at the value of Co[, it equal to: 
As we proof in chapter 5, user can not forge the content of the each signature with 
co-prime public exponent even several signatures are multiply together. Hence we can 
divide Co[ into terms depend on their exponents. Each terms will look like below: 
Since user cannot change the value of A, B, C and x. The only way he can change 
LR ； is to find a list r；, r’”…r； such that C；' -Q •••• C/ = Cf' -Q •••• C；' . One way to 
change the exponent is to find a set of roots that is multiplied together equal to the 
product of other set of roots. The probability of find such two sets successfully is 
where T is proportional to the time and space required. Otherwise, As far as we know, 
this problem is equivalent in computational difficulty to factoring (the problem is 
detailed mentioned in [CEG87]). 
Coin Double-spending 
As we know, every user can has not only one but a number of coins. That means User 
will have a list of secret values that embed in each coin. Let's think about bellow 
situation: 
A user want to double spend the money, she embed one coin in first payment, and 
embed the other coin in second payment. When two coins are deposited, the bank will 
find the coin is double-spent, but can not find the double-spender, since it will be 3 
unknown variables in 2 polynomials. 
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Let's look at our protocol to see if it can really happen. Before the user receive a 
coin, she should send out a challenge x, which is an output of a one-way function fs 
with input a, b, c where a, b, c is the base numbers of the coin that should be used next 
time. This method restricts the coin that will be used in next payment. Hence. The 
above situation will not happen. 
Generation of a，b，c 
If User can find two coins Coin and Coin，such that their base numbers satisfy 
f^{a,b,c) = f](a',b',c') , double-spending will become very easy. Since fs is an 
one-way and collision resistant function (detail please refer to section 2.6), it is 
impossible to find the other triple (a，，b，，c') that has the same output as triple (a, b, c). 
So can User find two coins such that their base number is the same? The answer is 
negative. The withdrawal protocol makes sure that base numbers is randomly chose, 
both bank and user can not control the values of (a, b, c). The probability of a user gets 
two coins with same base numbers is very small, approach to zero. 
Framing by the Bank 
In order to protect user against framing by the bank we need a little modification on the 
protocol. Let [/be the concatenation of user's identity and a unique coin number. This 
makes the ITs of all the coins distinct. If the bank want to accuses a user of having 
doubles-spent a coin, the bank has to tell the challenges and responses (say 2 pairs of (x, 
r)) that found with corresponding a, b and c (all of them are verifiable by a third party.). 
If the user didn't spend the coin with that identity twice, bank have no knowledge of a, 
b, or c. So if the bank tries to frame the user, the triple {a, b, c) will be different (with 
high probability) from the actual values used by the user. If the user can provide a coin 
with different triple {a, b, c) that match the value of U, then the bank must be framing 
the user, as she cannot generate a new triple which matches the same value of U. 
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Late Detection of double-spender 
In single payment, double spender can be detected soon because the coin only spent 
once. But for transferable e-coin, it has different case. Each transfer delays the 
detection of double-spender. Double-spender will not be noticed until two copies of 
the same coin are deposited and it may be too late by then. We can solve this problem 
by adding timestamps (details please refer to section 2.9) into each valued coin, the 
time-stamping will indicate the time that the coin is withdrawal. When user finds the 
coin is too old to use, he should deposit it into the bank. 
Coin Recognition 
Users can recognize their coin if they see it later in another payment. It is acceptable, 
since in the real world, we also have the ability to recognize the paper cash when we 
receive it again. 
Unfortunately, we cannot prove that there is no other way for user to cheat. The 
attacks described above are only the most obvious ones. At present, the state of the art 
in cryptography does not allow us in general to prove the security of such a protocol. 
6.7 Complexity Analysis 
In this chapter we analyze the complexity of the proposed transferable e-coin system. 
Coin grows in size 
Any transferable electronic cash system has the property that the coin must grow in 
size [ChaPe93] each time it is spent because of the information it has to contain. This 
information is about every person who has spent the coin for the bank to maintain its 
ability to catch multiple spenders. This limits the maximum number of transfers 
allowed in the system by the allowable size of the coin. In the protocol, we assume that 
the Bank public a number I that is the maximum number of transfers. If a user receives 
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a coin, which was transferred for I times, it means the size of coin is too large to use, 
the user should deposit the coin and cannot pay it anymore. Other user has the right to 
refuse this coin because its size is not suitable for further payments. 
Divisibility of the Coin 
The system described so far in this report does not have the ability to split the coin into 
smaller sub parts. The main reason of we don't add divisibility into system is that the 
whole system will become very complex, which makes system extremely difficult to 
understand, verify, implement or debug. 
Checklist of Bank 
To detect double-spending, the bank should store all base numbers, challenges and 
responses of deposited coins in the checklist. The bank needs a huge storage database, 
and the size of database grows day by day. To solve this problem, we add a time limit 
to coins, for example one year, the coin should be deposit before the time limit. After 
the time limit, the coin will become invalid and cannot be use anymore. This method 
can prevent bank's database from growing unlimitedly. Moreover, This method saves 
the computational power and increases system's security. 
Computational Efficiency 
As we can see, the user should verify all previous payments during the transaction. For 
one more transfer, the user need to multiply two more terms which has the power x and 
k 
r respectively, i.e. the user needs to compute out the value of 7 7 gf (where k is 
/=i 
increase by 2 after one transfer) in each transaction. Using vector addition chain 
k techniques (see [Cos90] and [OliSl]), we can efficiently compute the value of J^g； 
M 
in RSA system even for large k. The basic steps are as follow: 
Step 1 Input and 
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Step 2 Sort the k elements (g/’a!)，...,(gfc, cik) in descending order on the (The 
new sequence (g/,c!/),.. (ik) is such that a, > a. > • • • > a^). 
Step 3 For /二 1 to 人'-1 do C//M/,-C""，gi-i ligi•卜 If “stop-condition” holds then 
k 
output g" else go Step 2. 
i=\ 
Please note that the stop-condition depends on how small the index-tuple has 
become. The meaning of small itself depends on whether one can apply table lookup 
or do precomputalions and so on. In general, it depends on the particular ein ironment 
the algorithm is implemented in. 
Size of Base Numbers 
In our system, one coin have three base numbers a, h. and r, ihc storage si/c will be 
smaller if wc can generate C, A, and B under one-way functions of a single base 
number c. Then wc could store a single coin in about 70 bytes | However, 
conslnicting an clllcicnt w ilhdraw al protocol for such a coin remains an open problem. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chaplcr wc inlrotliical a new off-line iransfcrablc c-coiii system motivated by 
1-crguson's singlc-lcnn ofT-linc coins system. AlllKniuh the ahiluy lo ircinstcr paper 
cash IS \ cr> iniportanl in mir tiailv life, there arc only a little clccironic payment papers 
talking about iranstcrahilil) hccausc of its dilliciill) in iniplcmciitalUMi. The proposal 
of singlc-tiTm c-cash protocol nuikcs application of trans I crab Ic on c-cash svslcni 
bccoinc possible. In our protocol. Anonymous is proicclccl h\ using Kaiuloini/cci 
Blind Signature aiui cloiihlc-spciuiinu is prevented h\ using polynomial sccrcl sharini; 
schciiie. The protocol uc proposed here is ihc firsi sinelc-lcnn iranstcrahlc c-cash. 
vJiich IS more ciTiciciu ami simpler ihan the okl nuilnplc-icrm c-cash s\siciii. 
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Chapter 7 
A New Off-line E-check System 
7.1 Introduction 
Although the basic Ferguson's payment protocol is quite efficient and does not require 
much storage space if the user pays at a shop with a bunch of coins, it is considerable 
quite expensive (in complexity) if we want to pay the money with amounts that can 
only be paid with many coins are involved. For this purpose, we propose an electronic 
check system in this chapter. 
In the basic coin system, the user withdraws a fix amount of money from the bank 
and cannot change the value of each coin during the transaction. The basic unit in the 
off-line payment system that we going to create is called check, which can be used for 
a variable amount, not determined at the withdrawal transaction. The way we 
implement the property of e-check, essentially, is that we make the user pay the 
maximum value of the check at the withdrawal time, and give him a refund for the part 
of the check that he didn't use at the payment transaction. 
Until now, several e-check schemes including on-line systems [Cha90] and 
off-line systems [VA90, ChaDB90, Bra93] are proposed. Most of them are using 
cut-and-choose methodology except Brands' scheme [Bra93]. The scheme we present 
here is more efficiency than the Brands' scheme. 
In this chapter, we present two e-check systems: one is very simple and efficient 
but only support partial anonymous; the other one is more complex and supports both 
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privacy and untraceability. 
7.2 E-checks Models 
The transaction model of an e-check system is slight different compare with the one 
we introduced previously (see Figure 7.1). Here we find that there is an extra 
transaction, called refund transaction. 
BANK 
(1) Withdrawal / / \ y / \ (3)Deposit 
Refund \ 
^ ( 2 ) Payment ^  PAYER - 1 _ - ^ SHOP 
Figure 7.1: The transaction model of e-check system 
The user first gets a check from the bank by the execution of a withdrawal 
protocol. The amount of check is decided by the user, which present the maximum the 
amount of money that the user can pay to the shop. The bank charges the user, by 
taking the equivalent amount of "traditional" money out of user's bank account. After 
the withdrawal, the check is transferred from the user to the shop in a payment 
transaction. Before the check is actually given to the shop, the user will adjust the 
value of the check to the amount agreed by both the shop and the user. (Please note that, 
the payee's representation of electronic check need not necessarily be the same as that 
for the payer, and in fact it preferably is not.) The shop then deposits the electronic 
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check from the bank with the equivalent amount of money in the payment. Since the 
user only uses a part of the check in the payment transaction, she can refund her 
money from the bank with the value she didn't use. 
The refund transaction of the last batch of checks is usually done together with 
the withdrawal transaction of the next batch. There is no transferability in this model. 
More about this will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
7.3 E-Check System with Partial Privacy 
In this chapter, we introduce a new e-check system, which is much simpler than 
previously proposed e-check system. Paying the check with a desired amount is just as 
efficient as a single coin. But the system only supports partial anonymous and does not 
satisfy perfect untraceability, i.e. the bank can link the payment and the user together 
when the user want to refund the check. But the system is still useful in some 
applications that untraceability does not provide any problems. 
7.3.1 The Withdrawal Protocol 
The withdrawal protocol is basically same as the Ferguson's withdrawal protocol with 
small modification on the denomination scheme. In chapter 5.1, we defined a list of 
distinct public exponents associated with a list of denominations. In the e-check 
system we also have a list of co-prime numbers (v/, vj, ...,Vk), with v^ root representing 
some amount of money, say $2''^. So multiplying the appropriate roots according to the 
binary expansion of the particular amount can represent any amount up to $2^-1. For 
example, a 5th root worth $2, a root worth $4, and a 35th root worth $6. 
Before the withdrawal (figure 7.2) actually takes place. The user and the bank 
have to come to an agreement on which amount of money that will be withdrawn and 
the bank uses the corresponding key to make the signature. In the protocol described 
below, we assume that the user wants to withdraw an e-check with amount $ 2 � 1 , and 
52 
Chapter 7 A new Off-line E-check System 
the signature can be modified by public key v, -v^ v^. 
Step 1 The user chooses randomly a!, c/, bj (her three contributions to the base 
numbers) and y (the blinding factors). She computes 
广、b�gt and sends them to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank then chooses her three contributions to the base numbers Q, a2, b2. 
And sends h ; � h t and a � to the user. Sending a : directly allows the user to 
raise one of the resulting signatures to a power she chooses. 
Step 3 The user chooses a random number ti and computes 
a <r- (a^a^ •/2 (e^, e ^ , where J\ is an one - way function. 
ea — + / ( � ) -r . 
The user sends e^, e^  and e^  to the bank. 
Step 4 The bank computes the blinded version of A, B and C. 
The bank then chooses a random number t � a n d sends 
C 2 A , t ” i p 广 2 i , a n d ( P , ^ ) i � 2 i to User. 
Step 5 The user now constructs the numbers 
C — 叹 � ,J — " � : ( „ ) ,万—妃 . � 
and computes two signatures 
& — ( ( P 广 1 .互广 1 丨丫up 
She checks the signatures she received are correct by verifying that 
I 万 where f = 
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玉 — � . � t . J h . g l h 
C C^C2 
b <- b^bj 
t — V2 
C — e g / � 
A — ag.[�a� 
B — bgi�"h� 




Figure 7.2: The withdrawal protocol of e-check system with partial privacy 
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The user ends up with the following set of numbers: a, b, c, t, Sa and St which are 
the 3 base numbers, the random parameter for the secret sharing line and the 2 
signatures. 
7-3-2 The Payment Protocol 
Before the execution of actual payment, the user needs to devalue the check to the 
desired amount. To maintain protocol's generality in figure 7.3, we assume that the 
user wants to pay to the shop, where \ < i < k . 
User Shop 
c. a. h 
• 
X < 





A — agf，、 
B — bg，、 
Figure 7.3: The payment protocol of e-check system with partial privacy 
Step 1 The user devalues the check from $2"-l to $2'-l by compute out 
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� v,+,…， 
fe产 1 
step 2 The user sends a, b, and c to the shop. 
Step 3 The shop replies with a randomly chosen challenge x. 
Step 4 The user computes r — tx + U and Co <- {S:{S'b). 
And sends the results to the shop. 
Step 5 The shop verifies the consistency of these two responses by 
C — cgc彻、 
A — agi�"� 
B — b g f , � 
(Co广…V, 二 5 
and then she accepts the payment. 
After the payment, the shop saves 3 base numbers, the challenge, the response, 
the bank's signature and the amount of the check for later deposit. 
7.3.3 The Deposit Protocol 
The deposit protocol, which is shown in Figure 7.4, is very simple. It only needs one 
communication. 
Step 1 The shop sends c, a, b, the challenge x, the responses r, the signature Co and 
the amount of check, i.e. $2'-l, to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank verifies the correctness of the check and credits shop's account 
with corresponding amount. 
Step 3 The bank searches through the checklist to find if the check with base 
numbers {a, h, c) have been double-spent before. The bank can easy find the 
double-spender, since she must reveal two different points on the line 
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r — tx + U which immediately allows the bank to determine her identity U. 
Shop Bank  




increase shop's account with amount $2' - 1 
check for double — spending 
save numbers a, b, c, x, r to checklist 
Figure 7.4: The Deposit protocol of e-check system with partial privacy 
7.3.4 The Refund Protocol 
When the user wants a refund for the amount of the check which she did not spent. She 
first informs the bank her account number and the amount that she wants to refund (in 
this case, it is $2^-l-2'-l). 
Step 1 The user sends check's base numbers (a, b, c), r, x, and (CA^B)''^ to the 
bank. 
Step 2 The Bank verifies the check similar the way that coins are verified (see 
section 4.4.2). 
Step 3 The bank search the check in the list and verifies that the amount of the check 
with base numbers (a, b, c) have been spent less than or equal to $2'-l. Than 
the bank refunds the money to user's account. 
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Step 4 The bank stores the check with user's account number to prevent later use. 
Notice the user can refund multiple checks at the same time. And the refund 
transaction is usually done together with the withdrawal transaction of the next checks. 
7.3.5 Protocol Discussion 
System Security 
In the protocol, we fund that the user can obtain a list of Bank's signatures. Can the 
user obtain the other signature that represents a larger amount of money? The 
answer is negative. A result of Shamir [Sha83] states that it is feasible for A to compute 
xizm from ( X ， x ^ Z A K ) if and only if m divides the least common multiple of 
(ai,...,ak). 
Partial Privacy 
This protocol only supports partial anonymous, the shop doesn't know the identity of 
the user, but the bank can trace the check after it is refunded. She should show the 
value of (<3, b, c), in case that the bank can verify the check. Since the base numbers are 
unique for each check (as we discussed in chapter 6, the probability of two checks have 
the same base numbers approach to zero), the bank can search the checklist to find 
which shop deposit the check with same base numbers. Once the bank finds the 
deposited check, the bank can link user's identity and her payment together. 
Computational Efficiency 
The withdrawal and payment protocol is as efficient as paying a single coin. The extra 
method that the user needs to do is devaluing the check to a suitable amount before 
payment. And refund protocol is very simple too; it only needs one communication 
between the bank and the user. 
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7.4 E-Check System with Unconditional 
Privacy 
In this chapter we will show how to incorporate anonymity to our e-check system that 
means even the bank cannot trace the relation between the user and the payment. 
Privacy is the most difficult part in designing a E-check system. If user want to refund 
the check, how does she prove the valid of the check without showing the unique 
numbers which allow the bank to have the ability to trace the payment? Hence in our 
new e-check protocol, the actual check system is somewhat more complicated than the 
previous one. 
In this new protocol, we use the other way to represent the denomination of the 
checks. We use a generator-turple , ,..., g^ ^ ] of length k, representing some 
amount of money, say So any amount up to $2^-1 can then be represented with 
different combination of generators. 
The check with maximum amount $2^-1 has k+\ signatures. One presents user's 
identity and remains are denomination parts each term presents an amount of 
The identity part: 广， 
The denomination parts : J^', . . . , (c' ' 乂々 )'‘ 
where ti is secret value used in random challenge and response process. The numbers C, 
B, Ai are of the form c g/(")，气 a,g"�("') respectively where t h e / ) is a suitable 
one-way function and all g's are publicly known elements or large order in the RSA 
group. We will show the protocol details in coming sections. 
7A1 The Withdrawal Protocol 
In this section, we will show how the withdrawal protocol from section 4.2.1 can be 
modified in a fairly straightforward manner for an e-check system (figure 7.5). 
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User Bank 
y^P^^i^R ^n V a nvi 6 v r： 
• * 
7 c, T b. �2,办2，“/.2 � ? Z 
丨2 < 
仏 會 ) - ^ ^ 
‘； 仏 〜 ^ 
玉 — 痛 . h . gib 
4 — <^i lga, • ^12 • f l ij,已c ,已 J . ga： 
C <— C^Cj 
b <r- b^bj 
B — bgi�hbb� 
sf=cu B 
y八 
Figure 7.5: the withdrawal protocol of e-check system with unconditional privacy 
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Please note that in the figure occurrences of i are assumed to be over the range 1，…，k. 
You can find that if we only use one denomination term, it will become the original 
withdrawal protocol, i.e. k=\. 
Step 1 The user generates random numbers (her contributions to 
the base numbers), (the blinding factors). And 
sends f c .g^, p ' h . g l , , . . . , t o the bank. 
Step 2 The bank chooses her k+2 contributions to the base numbers 
c”b2,a\2,.",ak2 • And sends to the user. Sending 
以12,...,<2 众 2 directly allows user to raise one of the resulting signatures to a 
power she chooses. 
Step 3 The user chooses krandom numbers and computes 
� — . where is an one - way function 
hi 
The user sends ,e办，e。！，.，e^^  to the bank. 
Step 4 The bank computes the blinded versions ofAj,...^/,, B and C. 
A — •以 12 . /2 (1, ec, Cb). g；；" 
A I <«“《§•；；: . / 2 ( � e � e j £ r 
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The following relations hold between the blinded numbers and their 
unblinded values: 
The bank then chooses k random numbers ti2,".,tk2 and sends 
, 3 ) ' ' to the user. 
Step 5 Using Q and b2 the user can compute c and b as C /Q and bib� respectively. 
She now constructs the number C, as 
where t^  ―广丄/,?,…,、— 
And computes k+\ signatures 
s M e . 对 、 f p 
X — ( ( �J V � ) ’ 
Finally the user verifies the signatures she received by 
Sv:=cu B 
Sl-C^A, 
The user ends up with 3^+5 numbers 7 , jB, c’ b’ a/，...，办，tj,...,tk and So,... ,Sk 
which are the 2 blinding factors, k+2 base numbers, k random parameters for the secret 
sharing line and k+l signatures. The bank will list C, B (where C =广C, B = fTB) 
and unique check ID U (we assume that U is concatenation of User's ID and check's 
ID) with user's account in case that user will refund the check later. 
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7-4.2 The Payment Protocol 
Compare with withdrawal protocol, the payment protocol is much simpler (figure 7.6). 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the user wishes to spend an amount 
corresponding to j, i.e. $2M (1 < j <k), as example. 
User Shop 
, ly, ct-^，"•，a j 
• 
< ^  
r, — + " 
5 …5 厂”ch�5 . • • 5 ch I 
: • 
B^bgi^ 
A —以 j ^ ) 
、一 a丨4'� 
{Ch,y A；B 
/ / J 
Figure 7.6: The payment protocol of e-check system with unconditional privacy 
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Step 1 The user starts by sending c, b, ai,…，a�, to the shop. 
Step 2 The shop replies a random challenge x. 
Step 3 The user computes out r!’ …，r�where and sends them to the shop 
together with RSA signature that proves the response is correct, i.e. 
Chi=(So)(Si)\ 
Step 4 The shop computes out j+2 base numbers 
C — e g / . � 
明〈(“丨） 
and verifies j signatures by following methods 
A] B 
The shop save signatures together with c, b, a]，…，aj, x, r /， r j for later 
deposit. 
We still need to make a few addition to this protocol to make sure that the 
challenges are different at each payment time, the challenges can be generated by 
using an one-way function with unique inputs, for example x=/(shop-ID, time). 
7.4.3 The Deposit Protocol 
The deposit protocol is as simple as the deposit process of a coin. 
Step 1 The shop sends c, b’ aj, ...,aj, x, r!’ ...，/}’ Chi, ...’Chj and the amount of check 
(i.e. $2^-1) to the bank. 
Step 2 The bank verifies the signatures by following methods 
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If the check is valid, the bank increases shop's account by $2^+1. 
Step 3 The bank then checks a!’ …’a�in the checklist, to see if it has been 
double-spent before. The double-spender can be identified easily from 
different challenges and responses of double-spent checks. 
7.4.4 The Refund Protocol 
When the user wants a refund for the amount of the check which she did not spent, The 
user first informs the bank of his account number and the unique check ID 
The bank verifies that Uis listed with user's account and finds corresponding C, B . 
Step 1 The user sends a川 , . . . , � ” tj^ ,^…,广众 to the Bank. 
Step 2 The bank searchs through his checklist to see if aj^^ have been used 
before. If not, the bank random generates a number x, and sends it to the 
user. 
The bank computes out ry+/,…，厂",where � t i X + U . 
Step 3 The user does the same computation, find rj+i,…，n and then computes out 
Ch，j女“…,Ch，k, where Ch: <- X乂 »'' P • 
9 Step 4 The bank verifies Ch，/ by (Ch'.y = A^B . 
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User Bank 
If U listed with account? 
Find corresponding C, B 
^7+1 ,. .., G/t, ^ j+\,...,广A: 
• 
Find if 以乂+！ have been 
spent before 
<  
—tkOC + U 
— (S�)(乂 
Ch，””…,Ch'k r, <r-t,x + U 
• 
“;J〈〜互 
{ c K y l c ^ A i B 
Figure 7.7: The Refund Protocol of e-check system with unconditional privacy 
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Step 5 The bank checks the checklist to see if ，•.，以& have been used before. If 
not, the bank accepts the check and refunds the appropriate amount of 
money to user's account. And puts 以乂+”...,“々 on refund list. She then 
erases U, C, 5 from User's account. 
7-4.5 Protocol Discussion 
Privacy 
In this protocol, we can found that the information we given in the payment doesn't 
link any information used in refund protocol. Bank cannot link the check that used in 
the payment and its refund together. It is easy to prove that the privacy of the user is 
guaranteed unconditionally. 
Storage Space 
For a maximum $2^-1 amount of check, the user must store 2 blind factor, k+2 base 
numbers, k secret values, 1 check ID and k+1 signatures. When k is large, compare to 
store $2人-1 amount of coin, it saves a lot of storage space. Moreover, we can smaller 
the size of check, if the bank signs different denomination term with different key. The 
user can multiply the terms together and separates them later by using the method 
described in section 5.2. But this method need more computational power to separate 
the signatures when the user want to pay the check to shop. 
Computational Power 
The computational requirements are much higher for an e-check system in the amount 
of payment that can be made by small number of coins. But the protocol is efficient 
when amounts that can only be paid with many coins are involved. 
Extend to Transferability 
We can include transferability (or denomination expansion) to e-check system by 
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using the method described in chapter 6. But it will increase systems complexity since 
user not only need to check each denomination terms but also need to verify all the 
transactions have made before during each payment. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduce two e-check systems. One is almost as efficient as a single 
coin system, but only support partial privacy. The bank only does 2 signatures during 
withdrawal, and refund protocol only need one communicaion. 
The other e-check system guarantee both privacy and untraceability. The protocol 
needs more computational power than the previous one, but it is much more efficient 
compare with traditional e-check system which use multiple terms for random 




Paying for goods and services electronically becomes more and more common in our 
daily life. Since the late 1970s, a variety of schemes have been proposed to allow 
payment to be effected across a computer network 
In this thesis, we have made a thorough study on electronic payment system by 
introducing the common models, showing their basic requirements, classifying 
schemes' efficiency, giving proposing history of some famous electronic payment 
schemes. 
However most electronic payment schemes are very complex and slow to 
implement until the presentation of single-term payment system. In our thesis, we first 
introduced a single-term off-line coins system, which is the fastest to date among the 
proposed payment systems. And then, we present two new electronic payment systems: 
an off-line transferable e-coin system and an off-line e-check system. They are much 
more efficient and simpler than the old electronic payment schemes. 
In off-line transferable e-coin system, user can spend the received coin in a later 
payment to a third person without contacting the bank or another central authority 
between two transactions. Before final user deposit the money, a list of user's 
information will be embedded in the coin. The bank can identify the double-spender 
and other user's privacy will be preserved. 
In the e-check system, we constructed two protocols: one is very simple and 
efficient but only support partial user privacy; the other one support both privacy and 
untraceability but more complex to implement (it is still efficient compare with other 
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proposed e-check systems). 
To conclude, electronic payment system will become more and more important 
because of information revolution. We believe that upon further modifications and 
development, electronic payment will gain a majority position in payment system of 
our coming life. 
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